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Evidence from laboratory experiments suggests that important disparities exist between willingness
to pay (WTP) and compensation demanded for the same good.  This study advances, and experimentally
tests, a new explanation of the WTP/WTA disparity—a dynamic theory based on the presence of commitment
costs.  We find that the commitment cost theory combined with a simple behavioral anomaly is able
to lend insights into the causes and severity of the WTA/WTP disparity.  Further, we find that market
experience attenuates the behavioral anomaly, consistent with the notion that no value disparity exists
















A fundamental tenet in neoclassical theory is the basic independence assumption:  an 
individual’s preferences are assumed to be measured over levels, not changes.  While most 
theoretical and applied economic models invoke this assumption, a wealth of data from 
laboratory experiments refutes this premise, as systemic empirical disparities have been 
observed between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) for the same 
good (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990), with WTA often observed to be many times larger than 
WTA. In an influential line of work, Hanemann (1991) argues that the large WTA/WTP 
disparities that have been observed in the literature can be reconciled with static neoclassical 
theory via income and substitution effects;
1 but the empirical evidence to date has not 
conformed well to Hanemann’s (1991), or any other, neoclassical-based model.
2  I f  t h e  
observed value disparity is inconsistent with neoclassical explanations and is found to be a 
fundamental component of individual’s preferences, as per reference dependent theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), then a re-evaluation of a good 
deal of economic analysis is necessary.  
In this paper, we provide a different explanation for the WTA/WTP disparity—a 
dynamic theory based on the presence of commitment costs and possibly asymmetric beliefs 
about market opportunities. When the value of a good is uncertain, WTP and WTA will 
logically reflect compensation for the possibility of learning that the good has a different 
value than believed at the time of purchase or sale and the cost associated with reversing th 
purchase or sale decision. In its simplest form, our model predicts that with objective 
                                                 
1 Hanemann’s (1991) work extended that of Randall and Stoll (1980), who demonstrated that the WTA/WTP 
disparity depends on the “price flexibility of income.”  Hanemann proved that the “price flexibility of income” is 
analytically equivalent to the ratio of the ordinary income elasticity of demand for the good to the Allen-Uzawa 
elasticity of substitution between the good and the numeraire.  Thus, for low elasticity of substitution values, the 
“price flexibility of income” is large, suggesting that the WTA/WTP ratio is also large.   
2 See, for example, Sugden (1999), Horowitz and McConnell (2003) who show that the typical WTA and WTP 
disparity observed cannot be reasonably reconciled with the neoclassical explanation of Hanemann (1991).     3
(symmetric) beliefs about market opportunities (and with perfect substitutability and no 
income effects), there should be no value disparity.  Intuitively, the objective cost of delaying 
the purchase (or alternatively reversing the purchase) for prospective buyers is isomorphic to 
the objective cost of reversing (or delaying) the sale for prospective sellers.  This symmetry 
necessarily leads to WTA=WTP, consistent with the neoclassical paradigm. 
Importantly, however, it is an agent’s perception of the delay and reversal costs that 
motivates behavior.  If agents behave in a manner consistent with the developing literature on 
cognitive dissonance and/or limited memory, it is quite plausible for individuals to display an 
asymmetric perception of the relative costs of selling later, depending upon whether they are 
placed in the role of a buyer or seller.
3  This type of asymmetry alone can yield the systematic 
value divergences observed in the literature; indeed, we show that even with only slight 
asymmetries in beliefs of perceived costs, our theory can generate considerable value 
divergences because the actual divergence will depend upon the interaction of this asymmetry 
with the degree of value uncertainty, time preference, and lost value of consumption. 
We explore the predictive power of our theory by examining WTA and WTP 
statements of value from consumers in a competitive marketplace—the sportscard market.  
While we do not consider the sportscard marketplace particularly worthy of study in its own 
right, it is useful for our purposes for several reasons.  First, it is a natural setting for an 
examination of preference structures since it provides a rich pool of subjects making decisions 
in a familiar environment, with uncertainty and future learning about the values of traded 
goods.  Second, we can identify factors that arise endogenously, such as market experience, 
                                                 
3 We point the interested reader to Wicklund and Brehm (1976) for an overview of cognitive dissonance, and 
Akerlof and Dickens (1982), Konow (2000) and Oxoby (2004) for its application in economics. Rubinstein 
(1998) provides an overview of bounded rationality, including limited memory, and Wilson (2005) applies a 
limited memory model to explain over-confidence and confirmatory biases. 
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and impose the remaining controls necessary to implement a clean experiment to explore 
whether such factors attenuate the value disparity through the channels predicted by our 
theory.   
Our data are striking in that agents display an asymmetric perception of the relative 
costs of selling later, depending upon whether they are placed in the role of a buyer or seller.  
In particular, prospective buyers report that it will be more difficult to sell in the open market 
(after the experiment) than prospective sellers report.  Interestingly, all of the asymmetries in 
perceptions occur on the sell-side, where agents have relatively little experience—perceptions 
of “buying later” are similar across both sellers and buyers.  In this spirit, our results tie neatly 
back to the results from (List, 2003; 2004), who observed that the convergence in WTA/WTP 
values occurs entirely because of lower Hicksian equivalent surplus values.  Upon more 
closely examining our data, we find that the delay/reversal perceptions become symmetric as 
experience intensifies.  This provides a potential explanation of the empirical results from the 
lab that suggest market repetition attenuates the value disparity (e.g., Knez et al., 1985; 
Coursey et al., 1987; Brookshire and Coursey, 1987; Myagov and Plott, 1997).  Lending 
further support to our theory is our confirmation of several comparative static predictions:  
WTP (WTA) increases (decreases) in the degree of difficulty of delay and decreases 
(increases) in the degree of difficulty of reversing the transaction.   
We view these results as fundamental to both normative and positive issues.  First, our 
findings suggest that the basket of tools associated with Hicksian welfare measurement can be 
fundamentally preserved, albeit with additional care given to the presence and interpretation 
of commitment costs and their welfare effects.  Second, the value disparity disappears as 
market experience intensifies via attenuation of the behavioral bias, restoring commonly held   5
interpretations of indifference curves, cost/benefit analysis, and the procedures necessary to 
resolve damage disputes.   
I.  Theoretical Background 
Zhao and Kling (2001, 2004) present an explicitly dynamic theory of the formation of 
WTP and WTA and commitment costs under uncertainty and future learning.  In this section, 
we extend that model to the setting of actual market experiments.  We derive the conditions 
needed for commitment costs to arise and use these conditions to design experimental tests for 
the presence of commitment costs. 
Consider a subject who formulates her WTP or WTA facing a trading opportunity in 
an experiment, knowing that the same good (or a reasonable substitute) can be traded in the 
marketplace.  To add structure, assume that a WTP (WTA) subject is one who must state a 
WTP (WTA) value in an incentive compatible institution.  Let  [ , ] lh vv v   be her own 
(uncertain) valuation of the good, and let  [ , ] lh R RR   be her information about the market 
price of the good.  That is, she does not know v or R  with certainty, but knows their 
distributions.  For simplicity, we assume that she can learn both v and R with certainty later 
(e.g., after the experiment).
4 
Consider an experiment in which subjects can purchase a good.  If a subject decides to 
purchase the good in the experiment, but later (after learning v and R) decides the good is not 
worth keeping, she can sell it at the realized market price, R .  Doing so incurs a transaction 
cost 
r
p c , however, where subscript p denotes WTP, and superscript r denotes “reversing the 
trade.”  In contrast, if she decides not to buy the good in the experiment, she can purchase it 
                                                 
4 This assumption can be relaxed without changing the key results of our model.  If the uncertainty is only 
partially resolved, the magnitude of the commitment cost effect will be smaller than if the resolution is complete, 
but the qualitative results will remain unchanged.   6
later in the regular market if she chooses to, paying the market price R while incurring a 
transaction cost 
d
p c , where the superscript d denotes “delay.”  In experiments where subjects 
can sell the good, let 
r
A c  and 
d
A c  be the transaction costs of reversing the transaction (or 
buying the good back in the regular market) and delaying the decision (or selling the good 
later in the market). 
Formulation of WTP and WTA 
A subject’s WTP is defined as the maximum price she is willing to pay to buy the 
good in the experiment, knowing that she can later learn about her valuation v and the market 
price R.  Suppose she buys at price P: if after the experiment her realized value of the good v 
is lower than 
r
P R c  , she can sell the good and realize the gain 
r
P R cv   .  Thus her expected 
payoff of buying at price p in the experiment is 
  1 () ( ) r
P
r
P vRc UE vE R cvp
     , (1) 
where the second expectation is taken over both v and R in the region 
r
P vRc , and 
represents the option value of reversing the purchasing transaction.  To facilitate discussion, 
we denote this option value by 
r
P O , or 
  () r
P
rr
PP vRc OE R cv
  . (2) 
If the subject delays or declines to purchase at price p, she still has the option of 
buying the good later.  She will then gain v, but pay the market price R plus the transaction 
cost 
d
P c .  Thus her expected payoff is 
  2 () d
P
dd
P P vRc UOE v R c
   , (3) 
where the expectation is again taken over the region 
d
P vRc , and 
d
P O  denotes the option 
value of buying the good later.   7
The subject’s WTP is the unique p that equates  1 U  and  2 U .  Hence 
  () ( ) () ( ) ( ) . rd
PP
dr r d
PP P P vRc vRc WTP E v O O E v E R c v E v R c
           (4) 
The term 
dr
pp OO   is the commitment cost, representing the net loss of option values in 
committing to the purchase now.  Notice that WTP can be higher or lower than E(v), the 
expected value of the good, depending on the value of the two options and thus the sign of the 
commitment cost.  If the agent expects that the cost of reversing 
r
P c  is high but the cost of 
delaying 
d
P c  is low, then
r
P O  is low and 
d
P O  is high, yielding  () WTP E v  .  If 
rd
P P cc  , and the 
random value R-v (the negative of the consumer surplus) is symmetric around zero, then we 
expect the two option values to be equivalent, and  () WTP E v  .  Equation (4) also suggests 
that WTP is increasing in the cost of delay 
d
p c , but decreasing in the cost of reversal 
r
p c . 
  The formation of WTA follows a similar logic: a subject’s WTA is defined as the 
minimum price she is willing to accept to give up the good in the experiment.   Suppose she 
sells the good at price P.  She still has the option of buying the good back in the regular 
market (i.e., reversing her trade) at the market price R plus the transaction cost 
r
A c , the value 
of which is denoted as 
r
A O .  Thus her expected payoff is 
  1 () ( ) () r
A
rr
AA vRc PO E v PE vRc E v 
      . (5) 
If she does not sell the good during the experiment, she retains the opportunity to sell 
at the market price, incurring transaction cost 
d
A c .  Thus her expected payoff is 
  2 () d
A
dd
AA vRc OE R cv 
    , (6) 
where 
d
A O  denotes the option value of selling the good later.  
Again, equating  1   and  2  , we obtain WTA as   8
 () () ( ) ( ) dr
AA
dr d r
A AA A vRc vRc WTA E v O O E v E R c v E v R c
          , (7) 
and
dr
AA OO   is the associated commitment cost.  Similar to WTP, WTA can be below or 
above E(v), depending on the magnitude of 
d
A O  and 
r
A O .  If the subject expects that there is a 
small cost of delaying the transaction but a high cost of reversing it, or 
d
A c  is small and 
r
A c  is 
high, 
d
A O  is high and 
r
A O  is low, leading to  ( ) WTA E v  .  Further, WTA is increasing in the 
cost of reversal 
r
A c  but decreasing in the cost of delay 
d
A c . 
WTP/WTA Divergence 
  From (4) and (7), we know that 
 () ()
dr dr
A AP P WTA WTP O O O O     . (8) 
Therefore, the divergence between WTP and WTA equals the sum of the two commitment 
costs.  Further, WTA>WTP if at least one of the commitment costs is (sufficiently) positive. 
If subjects believe that reversing a transaction is more costly than conducting the transaction, 
then regardless of whether they are thinking about buying or selling, we would expect 
dr
A A OO   and 
dr
P P OO  , and thus WTA WTP  .  Notice, however, that reversing the selling 
decision is similar to delaying the buying decision: both involve buying the good later.  In this 
case, we may have 
rd
A P cc  .  Similarly, reversing the purchasing decision is similar to 
delaying the selling decision: both involve selling the good on the open market.  Then we may 
have 
rd
P A cc  .  In this case, 
dr
A P OO   and 
dr
P A OO  , and thus WTP WTA  . 
  The growing literature on cognitive dissonance and bounded rationality provides 
several reasons why we might observe an asymmetry in beliefs across these two scenarios.  
The theory of cognitive dissonance posits that agents may choose beliefs to reconcile with 
their actions and/or positions (Wicklund and Brehm, 1976).  A cognitively dissonant subject   9
may believe that her trading position, be it a seller or a buyer, is a “good” one in that it is not 
too unusual or atypical.  Thus, a subject in the WTA treatment may choose to believe that it is 
easier to sell in the future, compared with one in the WTP treatment.  Alternatively, a subject 
may have limited memory of her earlier trading experiences, and perceive the difficulties of 
selling and buying based on more recent experiences in the spirit of Piccione and Rubinstein 
(1997) and Wilson (2005).  While agents typically have rich experiences in buying, they tend 
to have much less experience in selling.  Those in the WTA treatment, however, gain 
immediate selling experience: they learn about the psychic, and other transaction, costs of 
selling in the experiment.  This experience, being the most recent, carries more weight than 
past experiences, in affecting perceived difficulties of selling.  In this sense, asymmetry in the 
number of recent buying and selling experiences may lead to asymmetry in perceived 
difficulties of buying and selling in the future.  Regardless of the source, whether such 
asymmetric perceptions exist in practice is ultimately an empirical question which we 
investigate. 
II. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
Our objectives in designing the field experiment were twofold: (i) to investigate 
whether subjects behave dynamically in forming their WTP and/or WTA values; that is, 
whether they take potential opportunities for delay or reversal into account when forming 
their bids or offers; and (ii) to examine whether conditions exist such that the dynamic 
formulation can explain the WTP/WTA value disparity.  Two distinct field experiments were 
undertaken to explore these issues.  The first experiment uses data on subjects’ perception of 
how difficult it would be to delay or reverse the proposed transactions.  The second 
experiment exogenously varies the degree of delay and reversal difficulties associated with 
the formation of WTA.    10
Field Experiment I:  Perceptions Treatments 
The first set of field treatments was carried out on the floor of a sportscard show in a 
large eastern city and includes two distinct treatments.  A total of 90 subjects were recruited 
for two treatments. In both treatments (denoted WTA and WTP), each subject’s experience 
typically followed four steps: (1) consideration of an invitation to participate, (2) inspection of 
the card, learning the auction rules, and placing actual bid (offer), (3) survey completion, and 
(4) debriefing.
5 There were 41 subjects in the WTA treatment and 49 in the WTP treatment. 
In Step 1 of both treatments, the monitor approached potential subjects and inquired about 
their interest in participating in an experiment.  If the subject agreed, the experimenter then 
invited the potential subject to take about five minutes to participate in an auction.  For both 
treatment types, we chose a Cal Ripken Jr., 1983 Topps baseball card, which has a book value 
of approximately $12.  Both treatments displayed the same sportscard to all bidders—a Cal 
Ripken Jr., PSA graded “PSA 8 near mint/mint” baseball card.  This particular choice of 
goods was appropriate as we conjectured that there would be a mix of subjects in this pool 
who would opt to sell or trade the card if they left the experiment with the good.   
In step 2, the monitor explained the rules of the random nth-price auction.  As 
described in List (2002), the random nth-price auction can be characterized by four simple 
steps:  (1) each bidder submits a bid (offer); (2) each bid (offer) is rank-ordered from lowest 
to highest;  (3) the monitor selects a random number (n) uniformly distributed between 2 and 
Z (Z bidders); and (4) in the WTP case, the monitor sells one unit of the good to each of the 
(n-1) highest bidders at the nth-price; in the WTA case, the monitor buys one unit each from 
the (n-1) lowest bidders and pays the nth-lowest bid. The random n
th price auction is incentive 
                                                 
5 We randomized participants into one of the two treatments by changing the treatment type at the top of each 
hour.  Subjects participated in only one treatment.     11
compatible: it is a player’s (weakly) dominant strategy to bid her true value (Shogren et al.), 
The monitor informed the participant that her bid would not be opened until after the show 
and that all bids would be destroyed when the research project was completed.   
In the WTA treatment, after the monitor physically gave the subject the card, the 
subject made her offer.  At this point, the reader will recognize that due to income (shifts in 
the indifference curve) and substitution (curvature of the indifference curves) effects, static 
neoclassical theory predicts value divergences.  We, therefore, endowed WTP subjects with 
$12 (which is equivalent to book value and approximately the average WTA from a pilot 
experiment) before they placed their auction bid so they would be moving (roughly) along the 
same segment of the same indifference curve as WTA subjects.  In this case, static 
neoclassical theory, which posits that indifference curves are perfectly reversible, predicts 
WTA=WTP. 
In step 3 the monitor asked the subject to complete a confidential survey that would be 
used for “statistical purposes only.”  The survey was used to obtain important information 
about what the subject planned to do with the good if she won the auction (WTP) or did not 
sell in the auction (WTA).
6  The choices included “keep,” “trade,” or “sell.”  The survey also 
obtained information about the subject’s perceptions of ease of trade or sale, ease of purchase, 
etc.  In the fourth stage of the experiment, the monitor explained that the participant would be 
contacted within three days after the show if he or she was among the n-1 highest (lowest) 
bidders (offerers).  Each subject was further informed that winners would receive the card 
after he or she had sent a check or money order for the amount of the nth highest bid.  The 
random n chosen was 24 for the WTP treatment and 30 for the WTA treatment.  Within three 
                                                 
6 The Appendix contains the WTP survey.  The WTA survey is similar, but with the necessary changes.   
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days the winners of each auction were notified by phone or email, and when the monitor 
received the check (card), he mailed out the card (check). 
Field Experiment II:  Exogenous Treatments 
The second set of field treatments was also carried out on the floor of a sportscard 
show in a large eastern city.  The same basic procedures were followed as described for the 
first set of treatments, with several key differences.  First, instead of using a sportscard, we 
used an unopened pack of sportscards as the good.  The pack of sportscards had a retail value 
of approximately $3, and had recently been introduced to the market, providing a sense of 
value uncertainty.  Second, only WTA values were elicited and there were three distinct 
treatments which differed by the ease of reversal or delay of the transaction. A total of 112 
subjects participated.  
The first treatment (with 55 subjects) serves as a control and links these results to the 
perceptions treatments in that subjects simply were given the pack of sportscards and were 
asked to state their minimum WTA in a random nth-price auction. In the second treatment 
(with 32 subjects), subjects were informed that if they sold their pack at the auction, they 
would be allowed to return the following week and re-purchase the pack from the monitor at 
the selling price (or subjects were informed that upon receipt of payment the monitor would 
mail the pack, postage paid).  We denote this treatment as the “goods-back-guarantee” (GBG) 
treatment—it was designed to reduce the cost to the subject of reversing a transaction, should 
the subject wish to do so.   
In the third treatment (with 25 participants), the subject was informed that if he did not 
sell his pack at the auction, he could return the following week and use space on the monitor’s 
dealer table to attempt to sell the pack.  We term this treatment the “table treatment”; it is 
designed to reduce the cost to the subject of delaying the transaction.     13
Hypotheses 
With these field data we are able to test two types of hypotheses.  First, we examine 
whether subjects form their WTP and WTA values dynamically: 




A c ) and 




A c) .  
 
In the first field experiment, we test this hypothesis in terms of the perceived delay and 
reversal difficulties.  In the second field experiment, we study the effects of both the 
perceived and actual delay and reversal difficulties.   
Second, we test whether the observed WTP/WTA divergences, if any, relate to the 
delay and reversal difficulties:  
Hypothesis 2: (i) WTA>WTP if subjects in both WTP and WTA treatments perceive 
that it is more difficult to reverse than to delay the respective transaction: 
rd
P P cc   
and 
rd
AA cc  ; 
(ii) WTA<WTP if subjects in both treatments perceive that it is easier to reverse than 
to delay the respective transactions: 
rd
P P cc   and 
rd
AA cc  ; 
(iii) WTA=WTP if subjects perceive the same selling (or buying) difficulties across 
the WTP and WTA transactions: 
rd
P A cc   and 
dr
P A cc  . 
 
Here, only the first set of field treatments is relevant, as data on both WTP and WTA are 
necessary, and perceptions of the delay and reversal difficulties are critical to the predictions. 
Note that even if the respondents behave according to the commitment cost theory, WTA is 
greater than WTP only when the perceived delay and reversal difficulties satisfy certain 
conditions.  Otherwise, it is possible that WTA is less than WTP.    
III.  Experimental Results 
Table 1 summarizes relevant statistics from field experiment I.  Column 1 contains 
statistics for the overall sample, while columns 2 and 3 contain information for the WTP and 
WTA treatments.  Data in the first row reveals that the average WTA ($12.37) is much larger   14
than the average WTP ($7.46)—this difference is statistically significant at conventional 
levels using both parametric and non-parametric tests.
7  Thus, the value divergence commonly 
found in the literature is certainly present in our field experiment I.   
Data presented in rows 2 and 3 suggest that WTA and WTP subjects who plan to keep 
the card behave differently from one another:  average WTA values ($15.39) are much larger 
than comparable WTP values ($7.00), and this difference is statistically significant.  Yet even 
for those who plan to trade/sell the card, a nontrivial value disparity exists: WTP = $7.67 
versus WTA = $10.00; this difference is statistically significant only at the p < .05 level using 
a one-sided alternative, however.  This result provides initial evidence that the Kahneman et 
al. (1990, p. 1328) intuition. that “there are some cases in which no endowment effect would 
be expected, such as when goods are purchased for resale rather than for utilization,” does not 
hold ubiquitously.
8   
Table 2 summarizes the relevant statistics for field experiment II, which was designed 
with treatments that exogenously varied the delay and reversal difficulties in the WTA 
treatment.  The reversal cost 
r
A c  is reduced in the GBG treatment, and the delay cost 
d
A c  is 
reduced in the Table treatment.  Subjects’ perceptions of the delay and reversal costs are also 
elicited via a survey instrument, as in field experiment I. 
As Table 2 suggests, mean offers for “keepers”—those who indicated that they 
expected to keep their pack if they did not sell it in the auction—as well as average values for 
“non-keepers” qualitatively mimic results contained in Table 1.  In all cases, keepers report a 
higher average WTA than non-keepers; further, keepers perceive that it is harder to reverse 
                                                 
7 Unless otherwise noted, all claims are supported by statistical tests at the 5% level.  For every unconditional 
comparison, we employ a two-sample (parametric) t-test and a two-sample (non-parametric) Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test.   
8 Average values of the subject-specific characteristics are similar across the two subsamples, indicating that our 
experimental procedure was successful at placing subjects randomly in the two treatments.   15
the trade and easier to delay selling the pack than non-keepers.  This asymmetric perception 
about the ease of delay and reversal is consistent with a higher WTA value for keepers, based 
on the commitment cost theory.   
Hypothesis 1 
Using data from field experiment I, we run a series of simple ordinary least squares 
bid/offer regressions, including reported reversal and delay difficulty, treatment indicators, 
gender, and whether the subject was a sportscard dealer as regressors.  Reported results are 
robust to inclusion of other variables that were gathered via the survey.  Table 3 (4) presents 
estimation results for six WTP (WTA) specifications, where the dependent variables are the 
individual bids (offers).  Specifications [1] and [2] estimate the effects of the difficulties of 
delaying and reversing the transaction on the WTP and WTA values; specifications [3] and 
[4] estimate the effects of being a keeper and dealer; and specifications [5] and [6] combine 
these models.
9   
Empirical results support our theoretical predictions:  reversal difficulty and delay 
difficulty are statistically significant at conventional levels, and their signs are consistent with 
predictions of the commitment cost theory for both WTP and WTA and across the 
specifications.  For example, reversal difficulty reduces WTP and increases WTA, while 
delay difficulty reduces WTA and increases WTP.   
In field experiment II, as shown in Table 2, the mean reported WTA for those with 
GBG is $3.23, which is statistically different from the mean WTA of the control group 
($4.66) at conventional levels.  Since a GBG reduces the reversal difficulty, this result is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1.  Results for the “Table” sub-sample are directionally consistent 
                                                 
9 Since “keepers” answered only the question of whether they would purchase the good in the future, only delay 
difficulty is included for WTP and only reversal difficulty is included for WTA in specifications [5] and [6].   16
with Hypothesis 1, but the mean WTA of $3.98 is not significantly different from $3.23 at 
conventional levels.   
As in field experiment I, we run a set of OLS regressions and report summary 
estimates in Table 5.  Table 5 includes a series of specifications that generally provides 
insights consonant with Hypothesis 1.  For example, in specification [1], while the Table 
dummy variable is directionally correct, though not significant at conventional levels, the 
GBG dummy is highly significant and negative, consistent with Hypothesis 1.  Further, 
empirical results in columns [2] and [3] of Table 5 show that the coefficient of reversal 
difficulty is positive and significant at conventional levels.  Specifications [4] and [5] provide 
insight into the robustness of the statistical significance of the treatment dummies with respect 
to the dealer and gender variables; in each case the GBG dummy variable remains statistically 
significant and negative.  Specifications in columns [6] – [8] report regression results using 
models that include delay difficulty and whether the subject planned to keep the good.
10  
Neither the perceived delay difficulty nor the table dummy is statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  However, the perceived reversal difficulty is statistically significant, and 
its sign is consistent with Hypothesis 1.
11  
Hypothesis 2 
We return to the field experiment I data to examine WTP and WTA values for various 
combinations of the perceived delay/reversal difficulties.  Table 6 pools subjects into three 
                                                 
10 The number of observations considerably decreases in these specifications due to the fact that many subjects 
left responses to these questions blank.   
11 Overall, in experiment II, the effects of the GBG and the perceived reversal difficulty provide support for 
Hypothesis 1, but the “Table” treatment and the perceived delay difficulty variables are consistently 
insignificant.  There are at least two possible explanations for this result.  One is that respondents did not view 
the offer to use the monitor’s table the next week as a significant decrease in the cost of delaying their 
transaction to notably lower their commitment costs (they would still have to take the time to come and use the 
table with an uncertain outcome).  Alternatively, respondents may not have been considering the delay 
possibility when forming their WTA values.    17
categories specified in Hypothesis 2.  Data summarized in Row [1] supports Hypothesis 2(i): 
the average WTA of $13.33 is larger than the average WTP of $5.84 for those who perceive a 
higher reversal difficulty than delay difficulty, and this difference is statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  Row [3] of Table 6 confirms Hypothesis 2(ii): WTP ($13.93) > WTA 
($6.25) for the case of reversal difficulty being smaller than the delay difficulty.  Again, the 
difference is statistically significant at conventional levels.  We find this result provocative, as 
it suggests the strength of the dynamic option-based theory—aligning groups of subjects by 
the degree of delay/reversal difficulty yields average WTP values that are greater than 
average WTA values, precisely as the commitment cost theory predicts.
12 
Several pieces of evidence from Table 6 are relevant for Hypothesis 2(iii).  First, for 
subjects who perceive a higher difficulty to sell than to buy in both WTP and WTA, average 
WTP ($5.84) is not significantly different from average WTA ($6.25); and, for those 
perceiving a higher difficulty to buy, average WTP ($13.93) is not statistically different from 
average WTA ($13.33).  Both null results are consistent with Hypothesis 2(iii).  Yet results 
summarized in row [2] of Table 6 do not confirm 2(iii): although our theory predicts WTP = 
WTA when the delay and reversal costs are equivalent, the data indicate WTA > WTP.   
Table 7 makes a finer split of the data by comparing specific levels of reversal/delay 
difficulties.  Each cell represents WTP (top value) and WTA (bottom value) values for 
subjects who perceived certain degrees of buying and selling difficulties.  For Hypothesis 2(i), 
the relevant comparisons are the WTP values in cells below the diagonal and WTA values in 
cells above the diagonal.  These are subjects who perceive a higher reversal difficulty than 
                                                 
12 Care should be taken not to push this result too hard, however.  Even though we are using a completely 
randomized field experiment where the subjects are drawn from the same population, these groupings are 
determined by individual reports, hence more than the cost of delay and reversal might differ between the 
individuals sampled.      18
delay difficulty in both WTP and WTA transactions.  In these data it is clear that WTA> WTP 
in either pair-wise comparisons or in aggregate, supporting Hypothesis 2(i).  
Similarly, Hypothesis 2(ii) is confirmed by a comparison of the WTP values in cells 
above the diagonal with WTA values in cells below the diagonal.  Further, since the WTP and 
WTA values in the same cell are formed under beliefs about selling and buying difficulties 
that are consistent across the WTP and WTA treatments, Hypothesis 2(iii) predicts that the 
two values should be equivalent in each cell.  Among the eight cells where both values are 
reported, the average WTP is similar to the average WTA in six cells (WTA is higher than 
WTP in the other two cells).  This observation supports Hypothesis 2(iii). 
Table 1 shows that in experiment I, subjects in the WTP and WTA treatments perceive 
different difficulties in selling the card in the future ($2.41 for subjects in WTP and $1.96 for 
WTA).  This asymmetry combined with Hypothesis 2(i) provides an explanation for the 
observed WTP and WTA divergence. In Table 8, we illustrate how this asymmetry is 
attenuated as the subjects become more experienced in trading. We grouped the subjects 
according to two measures of experience: the number of years they have been active in the 
sportscard market, and the number of sportscard shows they typically attend and trade in per 
year. When the experience is measured by the annual number of shows they typically 
participate in, inexperienced subjects (with the number of shows < 6) in WTP and WTA 
treatments report statistically significantly different difficulties of selling. This difference 
disappears for experienced subjects, who typically trade in more than 6 shows a year. This 
pattern does not hold when experience is measured by years of attending sportscard shows: 
the reported difficulties of selling remain statistically insignificant across the two treatment 
groups, regardless of the years of attendance. This finding suggests that it may be the actual   19
trading instead of simple attendance that reduces the asymmetry in perceived costs of selling 
across the WTP and WTA treatments. 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
  The divergence of compensation demanded and willingness to pay measures of value 
has prompted many economists to pause and contemplate whether the basic tenets of 
neoclassical theory are satisfied.  Some influential commentators have used the vast empirical 
evidence to call into question the fundamental building blocks of neoclassical theory.  While 
static neoclassical theories have been proposed to explain the observed preferences, the data 
have generally not matched predictions from these theories.  In this paper, we examine 
whether a dynamic neoclassical theory based on the presence of commitment costs can 
explain the behavior of individuals within a competitive marketplace.  In a nutshell, we ask 
whether we have been observing dynamic values but interpreting them as static.  To provide 
insight into this query, rather than impose all of the experimental controls exogenously on a 
convenience sample of undergraduates, we find a population in the field in which an 
important factor, market experience, arises naturally, where it can be identified easily, and 
then add the necessary controls.  
We find several pieces of evidence that are in favor of the commitment cost theory.  
First, our field data suggests that a value disparity exists, even for those consumers who plan 
to purchase the good for resale.  Second, in both data sets we find that the comparative static 
predictions of the theory perform quite well:  WTP (WTA) increases (decreases) in the 
difficulty of delay and decreases (increases) in the difficulty of reversing the transaction.  
Third, even under the most stringent of our theoretical conjectures—including cases where 
WTP is predicted to exceed WTA—our data are consistent with the theory.     20
More generally, we have presented clear evidence that agents form their WTP and 
WTA values dynamically.  When agents’ transactional positions systematically influence their 
perceived level of difficulty of resale on secondary markets, this dynamic behavior can 
explain the WTP/WTA behavioral anomaly.  Further, we lend insight into the causes and 
severity of the WTA/WTP disparity and provide formal structure to previous results on the 
effects of market experience on market anomalies.      21
 
References 
Akerlof, George A. and Dickens, William T. “The Economic Consequences of Cognitive 
Dissonance,” American Economic Review, 1982, 72(3), 307-319. 
Brookshire, David and Coursey, Don. “Measuring the Value of a Public Good: An Empirical 
Comparison of Elicitation Procedures,” American Economic Review, September 1987, 
77(4),  554-566. 
Coursey, Don, Hovis, John, and Schulze, William. “The Disparity Between Willingness to 
Accept and Willingness to Pay Measures of Value,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
1987, 102(3),  679-690. 
Hanemann, W. Michael. "Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept:  How Much Can 
They Differ?" American Economic Review, June 1991, 81(3),  635-647.  
Horowitz, John K. and McConnell, K.E. “Willingness to Accept, Willingness to Pay and the  
 Income  Effect,”  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2003, 51, 537-545. 
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler. “Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” Journal of Political Economy 1990, 98, 
1325-1348. 
Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk,” Econometrica, 1979, 47(2),  263-291. 
Knez, Peter, Smith, Vernon L., and Williams, Arlington. “Individual Rationality, Market 
Rationality, and Value Estimation,” American Economic Review, May 1985, 75(2),  
397-402. 
Konow, James. “Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation 
Decisions,” American Economic Review, 2000, 90(4), 1072-1091. 
List, John A. "Preference Reversals of a Different Kind: The "More Is Less" Phenomenon." 
American Economic Review, 2002, 92(5),  1636-1643. 
List, John A. “Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 2003, 118(1),  41-71. 
Myagkov Mikhail and Charles Plott, “Exchange Economies and Loss Exposure:  Experiments 
Exploring Prospect Theory and Competitive Equilibria in Market Environments,” 
American Economic Review, December, 1997, 87(5), 801-828. 
Oxoby, Robert J. “Cognitive Dissonance, Status and Growth of the Underclass,” Economic 
Journal, 114, 729-749. 
Piccione, Michele and Rubinstein, Ariel. “On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with 
Imperfect Recall,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, 20, 3-24. 
Randall, Alan and Stoll, John R. "Consumer's Surplus in Commodity Space," American 
Economic Review, June 1980, 71(3),  449-457. 
Rubinstein, Ariel. Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, MA, 1998. 
Shogren, Jason F., Michael Margolis, Cannon Koo, and John A. List. “A Random nth-Price 
Auction,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2001, 46(4), 409-421. 
Sugden, Robert. “Alternatives to the Neoclassical Theory of Choice,” in Valuing 
Environmental Preferences: Theory and Practice of the Contingent Valuation Method 
in the US, EU, and Developing Countries (Ian Bateman and K.G. Willis, eds.), Oxford 
University Press, 1999.   22
Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel. “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991, 106(4),  1039-1061. 
Wicklund, Robert A. and Brehm, Jack W. Perspectives on Cognitive Dissonance. Wiley, New 
York, 1976. 
Wilson, Andrea, “Bounded Memory and Biases in Information Processing,” working paper, 
2005, University of Chicago. 
Zhao, Jinhua and Kling, Catherine. “A New Explanation for the WTP/WTA Disparity,” 
Economics Letters, 2001, 73,  293-300. 
Zhao, Jinhua and Kling, Catherine. “Willingness to Pay, Compensating Variation, and the 
Cost of Commitment,” Economic Inquiry, 2004, 42, 503-517. 
   23
Appendix  WTP Survey 
These questions will be used for statistical purposes only.  THIS INFORMATION WILL BE 
KEPT CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL BE DESTROYED UPON COMPLETION OF THE 
STUDY. 
 
1.  How long have you been active in the sportscard and memorabilia market?  ______yrs 
 
2.  Are you a sportscard or sports memorabilia professional dealer?________ 
 
3.  How many sportscard or memorabilia shows do you attend in a typical year? _______ 
 
4.  In how many of those do you typically trade? ___________  
 
5.  Gender:  1) Male      2) Female 
 
6.  Age   ______            Date of Birth   ____________ 
 
7.  What is the highest grade of education that you have completed. (Circle one)    
     1) Eighth grade   3) 2-Year College                  5) 4-Year College 
     2) High School   4) Other Post-High School    6) Graduate School Education 
 
8.  What is your approximate yearly income from all sources, before taxes? 
    1) Less than $10,000        5) $40,000 to $49,999 
    2) $10,000 to $19,999      6) $50,000 to $74,999 
    3) $20,000 to $29,999      7) $75,000 to $99,999 
    4) $30,000 to $39,999      8) $100,000 or over 
 
9.  What do you think is the likely market value of the good (a range is fine)?________ 
 
10. If you win the auction: 
A.  What do you plan to do with the good? Sell it ____ Trade it ____ Keep it _____ 
 
B.  If you plan to sell/trade the good, how easy do you think it will be to sell/trade? 
 
1 (very easy)  2  3  4  5  (almost impossible) 
 
C.  If you decide to sell the good, which of the following do you think is true? You could 
(a)  recoup the full bid_____ 
(b) take a loss ______ 
(c)  earn a profit ______ 
 
11.  If you do not win the auction: 
A.  How easy do you think it will be to obtain the good (or a close substitute) later? 
 
1 (very easy)  2  3  4  5 (almost impossible) 
 
B.  If you were to purchase the good (or a close substitute) later, which of the following do you 
think is true? The purchase price would be 
a.  Above my bid ______ 
b.  Below my bid ______ 
c.  About the same as my bid _____   24
Table 1. Summary Statistics:  Field Experiment I* 
Variable  Total Sample  WTP Subsample WTA Subsample 

















































































2.41 (34)  
[1.10] 































* The table presents the sample means of the variables, with the number of sample 
points in parentheses and the standard deviations in square brackets.   25
Table 2. Summary Statistics: Field Experiment II* 
Variable  Total Sample  Base Subsample  GBG Subsample Table Subsample 




































































 0.56  (25) 
[0.51] 
Delay Difficulty
















































 1.45  (11) 
[0.82] 
















* The table presents the sample means of the variables, with the number of sample points in 
parentheses and the standard deviations in square brackets. 
1 Delay difficulty and intent to keep was collected only for the “Table” sub-sample and corresponding 
base sub-sample as explained in the text. 
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Table 3: Willingness-to-Pay Regressions:  Experiment I 
 




















      
Delay Difficulty









(=1 if keep) 

















(=1 if male) 




            
R
2  0.34 0.34 0.00  0.06  0.13  0.13 
N 34  34  49  49  49  49 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%   
a This is the response to question 10b  
b This is the response to question 11a  
 
 
Table 4: Willingness-to-Accept Regressions:  Experiment I 
  































      
Keep 
(=1 if keep) 

















(=1 if male) 








0.40 0.41 0.14  0.09 0.36  0.37 
N 23  23  41  41  41  41 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%   
**significant at 5% level 
aResponse to question 11a (note this is different from the WTP table) 
b This is the response to question 10.   27
 
  
Table 5: Willingness-to-Accept Regressions: Experiment II 
  












































































          - 0 . 3 5  
(-1.51) 
Keep 
(=1 if keep) 






(=1 if a dealer) 







   
Gender 
(=1 if male) 
      0.27 
(0.43) 
   




0.07  0.21  0.25 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.29 
N  112 89  89  112  112  50 50 41 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%   
a Response to question 11a. 
b Response to question 10b. 
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Table 6: Effects of Relative Reversal and Delay Difficulties, Experiment I* 
 
Relative Difficulties  WTP  WTA 
Mean N Mean  N 
[1]  
Reversal Difficulty 






















* Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
 
 Table 7: Perceptions of Reversal/Delay Difficulties, Experiment I* 
 
  Difficulty of buying later (Delay Diff. for WTP, or Reversal Diff. for WTA) 
















2 $6.8  (5) 
$7.4 (5) 







3 $5.5  (6) 
$4.3 (4) 
$8.3 (3)  
$9.0 (2) 
    




    






*The first entry is the average WTP, and the bottom entry is the average WTA; the sample size is in 
parentheses.   29
Table 8: Effects of Experience on Reported Difficulties of Selling 
 
 
Reported Difficulty of Selling: by years of trading experience
1 



























Reported Difficulty of Selling: by number of trades
1 
 
 WTP  WTA  Difference 
Experience 





















1. standard errors in parentheses 
df represents the degree of freedom in calculating the t-statistics of Difference 
*** indicates significance at 1% 
 